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CANONICAL AND LEGAL
FALLACIES OF THE
McGRATH THESIS ON
REORGANIZATION OF
CHURCH ENTITIES
REV. ADAM MAIDA*
A few years ago, Msgr. John McGrath addressed this distinguished
group of attorneys, and introduced a theory of law, both canon law and
civil law, concerning the ownership of our religious institutions. He made
some practical conclusions and recommendations. To this day, to the best
of my knowledge, his theories have not been rebutted, his recommenda-
tions have received wide acceptance, and the consequences have been most
serious for the Church. McGrath has stated, "If anyone owns the assets of
the charitable or educational institution, it is the general public. Failure
to appreciate this fact has led to the mistaken idea that the property of
the institution is the property of the sponsoring body."' Thus, what Henry
VIII did with a sword in England, what Napoleon did with his armies in
France, what Lenin did with a political philosophy, McGrath has at-
tempted to do, and has succeeded in many cases, with a legal theory. What
has utterly amazed me is the unchallenged receptivity of the theory and
its conclusions throughout the country.
The background out of which his thesis grew and the rationale upon
which it was developed was strongly conditioned upon the propitious time
in which it appeared.
The background and rationale for his thesis is predicated upon three
fundamental concepts:
(1) The need for change and updating as a result of Vatican II.
(2) The conviction that the Church should be a witness to poverty in the
world.
(3) Concepts of democracy, or should I say consumerism, ought to be opera-
tive in the government of the Church.
The first concept is articulated by McGrath as follows:
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Since the close of Vatican Council II great changes have been taking
place in the colleges, hospitals, and other institutions conducted by the Cath-
olic Church. Laymen, both Catholic and non-Catholic, have been added to
the governing boards of our institutions in such numbers that they are often
in the majority. It is the rare institution that is not engaged in rewriting its
by-laws or amending its charter. The rapid changes taking place in technol-
ogy, medicine, and society have called forth new challenges to those who
conduct institutions in the modern world. Change is the order of the day.2
The second concept, that of poverty, is expressed in these words:
The attitude of the general public is influenced by the way in which
Catholic institutions are presented to the community. The assets of the hos-
pital or college may be looked upon as the property of the diocese or religious
community, in which case the sponsoring body is thought to be quite
wealthy. The same institutions can be presented as public institutions not
owned but merely conducted under the auspices of the diocese or religious
community. The image is then one of service, and the meager income of the
religious staff is the Church's witness to poverty.3
The third concept, that of democracy or consumerism, is illustrated
in the following brief paragraph:
It has been repeatedly emphasized throughout this study that our Catho-
lic institutions of higher education and public health are institutions of pub-
lic trust. Their task is primarily one of service to the general public, and all
the groups served by these institutions should be represented on the board
of trustees: the local civic and business community, interested professional
groups, and alumni. In this way policy can be made with a view toward the
total role of the respective college or hospital. Furthermore, implementation
of this recommendation would provide a larger class of eligible, competent
professionals from which members of the board may be selected.'
Furthermore, two events had taken place which made his theories not
only seem reasonable but even desirable.
First, the promise and fact of federal and state aid to educational and
health related institutions was upon us. Uncle Sam and little brother,
State Government, were Messiahs arriving on the scene to save our institu-
tions from the brink of financial disaster.
Secondly, the Horace Mann cases in Maryland dealt a severe blow to
participation in federal and state aid programs, because three out of the
four of the dependent institutions were adjudged "too sectarian", and thus
denied participation in the educational aid programs under the Constitu-
tion of Maryland. The United States Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari. The course of action was clear: McGrath's proposal seemed a
salvation. He recommended changes in corporate charters and bylaws to
2 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 3.
Id. at 34-35.
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reflect the "public" nature of our Catholic institutions and further urged
that the government and control of these institutions be entrusted to com-
petent lay people representing the broad spectrum of the community, and
finally that the Religious Order or Diocese assume a sponsoring role rather
than an ownership role in its relationship to its institutions. In the judg-
ment of many, this would erase the sectarian character from the nature of
our institutions and thus make them available for a participation in federal
and state aid programs of one nature or another.
Lest my purpose in speaking before you is misconstrued, I want to
make it abundantly clear that I am dedicated to the preservation of the
rights of the Church in a free Society, to the Church's right to own and
administer property as a means of effecting Her Mission in the World. We
need not apologize to anyone for the institutions we own-they are valid
signs of the work of service done in Christ's name. Furthermore, notwith-
standing anything McGrath has said, our institutions under the Canon
Law of the Church are either moral persons or are ecclesiastical properties
belonging to or owned by moral persons. They are subject to the Canon
Law of the Church respecting their government and administration. The
civil law incorporation does not destroy our institutions as moral persons
and does not expropriate the ecclesiastical goods of the Church. All of this,
however, must be understood in proper context.
Briefly, we need to understand the civil and canon law premises of our
problem. A moral person may be defined as "a juridic entity constituted
by an act of competent authority, existing independently of other persons
and endowed with the capacity of acquiring and exercising rights as well
as of contracting obligations, by the means and to the extent determined
by the competent authority." 5
In general, it may be said that moral persons are to the Church what
corporations are in our civil society. Moral persons are created in one of
two ways:
(a) the law itself provides for them, e.g., the very fact that a diocese or
parish or religious order is created, it has a moral personality conferred by
law.
(b) or, a moral person may be created by the issuance of a formal decree of
erection given by a competent ecclesiastical authority.
This latter method is the nub of the canonical controversy, McGrath has
argued, since the law does not automatically confer moral personality, and
since none of our hospitals and colleges, except Catholic University and
Niagara University, have been erected as moral persons through the issu-
ance of a formal decree by the proper ecclesiastical authority, they are not
moral persons in the Church and the properties they own are not ecclesiast-
ical properties. But who owns these properties? Where is title? He argues,
most of these institutions are incorporated by the State, they are creatures
1 1 J. ABBO & J. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS 144 (1952).
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of the State, they are governed and administered according to the law of
the State, they function under their respective corporate charters and by-
laws, they live under the watchful eye of the attorney general, and finally,
all properties owned by these institutions have their legal title in the corpo-
ration and their equitable title in the general public whom they serve in a
charitable and public way.
In response to McGrath's canonical thesis, I cannot accept his conclu-
sion that the properties owned by our charitable institutions are not eccle-
siastical property under the laws of the Church. I can accept part of his
civil law analysis, but deny his conclusion that equitable title to these
institutions is in the general public and that services and money contrib-
uted by Dioceses, Religious Orders or Catholic Charities are to be consid-
ered and looked upon as gifts given over to civil law corporations and
beyond reach or claim of ecclesiastical authorities.
I am reluctant to bore you with an intricate canonical analysis of the
canonical problem involved and a refutation of McGrath's position. Bear
with me for a minute or two.
Canon Law is clear that the property owned by a moral person is
ecclesiastical property or ecclesiastical goods. These properties are man-
aged or administered by the moral person according to the norms of Canon
Law. If the law is not followed, the actions of the moral person may be
illicit or perhaps invalid. For example, let us assume that certain eccle-
siastical property is being sold. The law provides for appraisals to be made
prior to sale. If such an appraisal is not made and the moral person receives
fair market value, Canon Law would look upon the transaction as valid,
but illicit. On the other hand, let us assume that a Religious Order owns a
hospital, built and maintained solely by private funds and not separately
incorporated. Let us further assume that the Religious Order decides to
give the hospital to City X. Canon Law would characterize such a transac-
tion as an alienation by way of gift. Without the proper permission of
ecclesiastical authorities in Rome, such a transaction, canonically, would
be null and void. The Religious Order would be acting ultra vires. The Holy
See would have the right to demand a rescission of such a gift and demand
re-conveyance back to the Religious Order. The point is, once properties
are designated as ecclesiastical, those who administer and govern these
properties are bound to the Canon Law of the Church in the discharge of
their responsibility. This includes Bishops, Provincials, Major Superiors,
priests, lay people-every Catholic who is bound to the laws of the Church.
Furthermore, we live in a pluralistic society. Sound administration
would dictate that ecclesiastical administrators take all reasonable means
to protect the patrimony of the Church and conserve her assets so that the
Church can continue to do the work of Christ in the world. Among these
reasonable means may be a decision to incorporate a hospital or college.
Because the Church avails herself of these legal mechanisms to protect her
assets and facilitate the administration of her institutions in a complex
society, is in no way to be construed as a waiver of her claim over these
MCGRATH FALLACIES
goods and properties as ecclesiastical. At the same time, the Church recog-
nizes that the moment she avails herself of these civil law devices, she in
some way surrenders some of her autonomy in the ownership, government
and control of these properties.
Let me make one more canonical point before considering some real
life examples which illustrate the problem. McGrath has taken the posi-
tion that our colleges and hospitals are not moral persons in the Church,
therefore, the assets which comprise these institutions are not ecclesiasti-
cal properties. These institutions, because they are incorporated, have
their existence from the state; legal title is in the corporation and equitable
title in the general public. I have taken the position that these institutions
are ecclesiastical properties because they do belong to moral persons in the
Church. The Religious Order or diocese that founded, constructed or
caused these institutions to come into being and which has supported,
funded, operated and managed these institutions, is a moral person in
Canon Law. These institutions are the ecclesiastical property of such a
diocese or Religious Order. The incorporation of such institutions does not
constitute an alienation by way of gift of the assets contributed by the
Diocese or Religious Order to the civil law corporation. In reality, the
Church, for reasons of prudent management and administration of her
assets, has availed herself of legal means to protect and conserve her assets
and thus resorts to the civil law.
I wish to make a canonical argument in the alternative. No one would
deny that a hospital or college can be established as a moral person in the
Church, whose assets would then be ecclesiastical property. To become a
moral person, the law requires a formal decree of erection by a competent
authority. McGrath states that not a single authority indicates what this
formal decree consists of or who the proper authority is. By a huge step in
logic, he concludes that there are no formal decrees, and no ecclesiastical
authorities have acted to create hospitals and colleges as moral persons.
My research has led me to conclude that there are indeed eminent canon-
lawyers who have talked about the nature of this formal decree and who
the proper issuing authority might be. They speak about this formal decree
being implicit, i.e., establishing an institution and attributing to it the
prerogatives of moral personality, such as the right to sue or be sued. They
speak about the proper ecclesiastical authority as anyone who properly
exercises such authority in the name of the Church, e.g., Bishop or Provin-
cial. Consequently, there is good canonical opinion to sustain the conclu-
sion that these institutions are themselves moral persons in the Church,
and the property or assets they hold are ecclesiastical. In the alternative,
if they are not moral persons, they are ecclesiastical properties belonging
to moral persons such as a Diocese or Religious Order.
Let us look at some examples:
Hypothetical #1:
Religious Order "A" was founded in 1900 and at the time of founda-
tion acquired ten acres of ground upon which it built its monastery. In
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1910, upon legal advice of its attorney, the Order was incorporated under
the laws of the state. In 1920, this flourishing Order constructed a hospital
adjacent to the monastery upon a portion of the ten acre tract originally
purchased by Religious Order A. The hospital was constructed with funds
totally contributed by the priests of Religious Order A. In 1970, with dwin-
dling vocations and rising costs, Religious Order A wants to sell the hospi-
tal. What are the civil law and canonical consequences of this decision?
Religious Order A is a moral person in the Church. It is constituted
as such by the operation of law in that from the moment it was constituted
an ecclesiastical entity, Canon Law recognized it as a collegiate moral
person. As such, all property titled in the name of Religious Order A is
ecclesiastical property because it belongs to a moral person in the Church.
Therefore, the hospital, owned and operated by Order A, and located on
grounds of the monastery, is without question ecclesiastical property and
subject to all the laws and regulations of Canon Law and the particular
constitution of Order A concerning the administration of Church property.
The fact of incorporation in 1910 changed nothing of the ecclesiastical
juridical personality of Order A in 1910; it simply imposed upon it a legal
personality under the civil law with corresponding rights and obligations
in addition to the moral personality Religious Order A enjoyed from its
beginning in 1900. Assuming no restriction in the corporate charter, or
state law, Order A may sell the hospital. However, since the hospital is
ecclesiastical property, the law governing alienation must be observed and
consequently appropriate permission obtained from the Holy See.
One may conclude that the sale of the hospital is subject to the Canon
Law of the Church by arguing in the alternative that the hospital itself is
a non-collegiate moral person. It may be assumed that the decision to build
the hospital was made by competent ecclesiastical authority, namely, the
Major Superior of Order A. It may further be assumed that this decision
was communicated to the Religious Community and indeed to general
community at large. Permission to contract a debt may have been solicited
from the Holy See. This decision and pronouncement of the intention of
Order A to commit money and resources to the construction of a hospital
in and of itself is sufficient to constitute the formal decree wherein juridical
personality is conferred. Furthermore, deciding to construct the hospital,
it may be assumed that the hospital was given authority, and in fact
exercised authority, to own hospital property and be responsible for its
contractual obligations, thus exposing itself to the possibility of suing or
being sued. Having attributed to the hospital the distinctive characteris-
tics of moral personality, it may be concluded that the competent eccle-
siastical authority conferred a moral personality upon the hospital.
Hypothetical #2:
Religious Order "B" was founded in 1900 at which time it purchased
ten acres of ground and constructed a monastery. In 1910 upon advice of
its attorney, Religious Order B was incorporated. In 1920, Religious Order
B constructed a hospital on a portion of the ten acre tract. In 1930, to
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insulate the assets of the Religious Order B from potential liability and to
facilitate the management and administration of the hospital, the hospital
was separately incorporated. Over the years, the civic community and the
government have contributed approximately 25 percent of the funds used
in capital construction. In 1970, Hospital B wants to sell its assets and use
the proceeds to establish a retirement fund for its older priests. What are
the civil law and canonical consequences of this decision?
This hypothetical illustrates the legal and canonical dimensions of a
most difficult problem. Because Hospital B has a split juridical personal-
ity, responsible in one way to civil authority, and in another to ecclesiasti-
cal authority, inevitable difficult problems arise. When Hospital B was
constructed in 1920, it had no legal personality of its own, either in civil
law or canon law; in each instance, it was part of the monastery which was
both a civil corporation and a moral person. In 1930, it received a distinct
legal existence in civil law through incorporation. What did this imply? It
meant that the state gave birth to a new juridic person; this corporation
would now also be governed by the laws of the state and the corporation's
own charter and bylaws. As a non-profit corporation it exists to serve the
public good. The state is ultimately responsible to see that the purposes
of this corporation are carried out, and assure the general public that, upon
dissolution, the assets or proceeds from dissolution will be used for similar
charitable purposes.
At the time of its incorporation, what happened to the canonical jurid-
ical status of this entity? Nothing. The canonical status of Hospital B
remains essentially the same before and after the fact of incorporation. It
continues to function in the same manner, serves the same charitable
purposes, and operates under the same policies and procedures. The incor-
poration gives Hospital B a civil law status, with civil law rights, privileges
and responsibilities. The state neither has authority nor the jurisdiction to
radically affect the canonical status of a creature born of canon law. Simi-
larly, the Church cannot radically effect any change in the juridical per-
sonality, created by the state. The canonical status of the hospital is not
effected by the civil law incorporation and consequently the hospital re-
tains the same canonical status it enjoyed prior to acquiring a new legal
personality in civil law. Therefore, it may be concluded that the hospital,
although separately incorporated, nevertheless remains ecclesiastical
property which belongs to Order B; or in the alternative, it is a moral
person constituted as a juridical personality pursuant to the rationale
given in hypothetical #1 and the hospital assets are, in fact, ecclesiastical
property. In any event, to the extent that Religious Order B made a contri-
bution to the hospital, to that extent can Order B claim an equity in the
hospital on the grounds that the equity represents ecclesiastical property
and properly belongs to Order B. To the extent that the state or the general
public have contributed to this hospital, to that extent they can claim an
equitable right to the assets of the hospital.
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Hypothetical #3:
Assume all the facts as in Hypothetical #2, i.e., Religious Order C is
founded in 1900, is incorporated in 1910, builds Hospital C in 1920, incor-
porates Hospital C in 1930, and in 1971, decides to merge with Hospital
X, a general community, non-sectarian hospital to form a new health
facility designated as Hospital Y.
The canonical and civil law analysis is similar to the conclusions
drawn in #2, with the following modification. Hospital C, when it merges
with Hospital X, essentially, substantially and effectively contributes to
the creation of a new entity which is essentially distinct from the separate
entities known as Hospital C and Hospital X. The complete mingling of
assets, funds and resources and the surrendering of management and con-
trol of Hospital C in favor of the merged Hospital Y, is an alienation of
ecclesiastical property and is subject to all canonical provisions for the
alienation of property.
Hypothetical #4:
Assume the same fact situation as in Hypotheticals #2 and #3, except
that in 1971 Religious Order D decides to surrender the complete manage-
ment and control of the Hospital D to a lay Board of Trustees. The Board
of Trustees has the ultimate responsibility for the operation of Hospital D;
it can determine the policies and procedures under which the hospital
operates; it can direct the management and administration of the hospital;
it can hire or fire the administrator and personnel of the hospital; it has
the power and authority to change the provisions of the bylaws and peti-
tion the state for a change in the corporate charter; it can effectively buy
or sell or lease or encumber or mortgage the property which is owned by
the hospital. To confer such authority, to surrender such control, to convey
such powers is to substantially transfer over legal right, title and interest
in Hospital D, and thereby effectively alienate what was ecclesiastical
property. Consequently, the appointment of a lay Board of Trustees to
Hospital D is an alienation by way of donation and requires the appropri-
ate permission of the Holy See.
Hypothetical #5:
One final hypothetical. Religious Order E is founded in 1900 and
incorporated in the same year. In 1971, several of its members form a
corporation for the purpose of receiving twenty million dollars of govern-
ment money to build a home for the aged. This new corporation has a lay
Board of Trustees to manage this new facility and the Religious Order E
has agreed to administer it. The Religious Order has not invested any
monies in the facility and has not encumbered the property of the Religious
Order by guaranteeing any loan to the new corporation. Hopefully, it is
clear that the new health care facility is not a moral person in the Church,
it is not ecclesiastical property, the creation of a lay Board of Trustees is
not an alienation, and the new health care facility is in no way subject to
the laws of the Church. It is a purely secular institution which happens to
be operated and administered by a Religious Order.
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As a practical matter, our institutions are creatures of two worlds,
Church and State. They are born in both, and they exist in both. They
have responsibilities to Church and State and are governed by both. Those
of us who practice law on behalf of the Church in the context of civil law,
must use every legitimate vehicle to protect and conserve the patrimony
of the Church. On the other hand, each one of us, Bishop, priest, or layman
is bound by the laws of the Church, including Her laws on the governance
and administration of church property. The perplexing question becomes:
How do we best conserve the property of the Church, the patrimony of the
Church, in a pluralistic society where many forces work together against
us and where inevitable conflict arises between canon and civil law? What
devices and instrumentations of civil law can we use to protect our prop-
erty rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States?
The problems in this area are just beginning to unfold and we are wise if
we put our houses in order.
The laws of various states will differ, but I propose to make a number
of practical recommendations which will insure the Church's ownership
and control of Her institutions, and at the same time, respect the law of
the land in which we live.
Concerning the civil legal structure of Religious Congregations, the
following observations are made:
1) 1 believe sound legal judgment dictates that every Religious Order be
incorporated under the laws of the State in which the Motherhouse is located.
The reasons for such a judgment are obvious. Under canon law, the responsi-
bility for the government and administration of a Religious Community is in
the Major Superior and her Council. They are ultimately accountable, not
only to their membership, but also to the Holy See for their stewardship. The
fact that a Religious Congregation has been cloaked with or assumes a juridi-
cal status according to civil law through incorporation, in no way waives or
alters the responsibilities of a Major Superior and Her Council under Canon
Law. Therefore, for purposes of consistency in asserting responsibility, gov-
ernment and control of the Religious Order, it would seem most desirable
that the membership of the civil law corporation be limited to the Major
Superior and Her Council. Thus the government and control of the Religious
Order and the corporation will be consistent.
2) The charter of the Religious corporation should explicitly state that the
Order is an instrumentality of the Roman Catholic Church and subject to all
the doctrines, disciplines, laws, rules and regulations of the Catholic Church.
One of the principle reasons for such language is to afford the Religious Order
the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
3) The charter should also incorporate by reference, the Constitution and
Bylaws of the Religious Order.
4) A dissolution clause should provide for the disposition of assets according
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to the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church when and if the Religious
Order should cease to exist.
II
An analysis of the legal corporate structure of an institution founded
or sponsored or supported or funded by a Religious Order and its relation-
ship to the Religious Order is a bit more complex. What legal devices are
available to preserve and conserve the patrimony of the Church and the
equity of a Religious Order in its institutions? How do we honor the trust,
perhaps implied, of millions of religious and laity who have given their
lives and resources so that these institutions might continue to be wit-
nesses of charity performed in the name of Christ? We must make a dis-
tinction between those religious institutions which are newly founded and
incorporated and those which are already incorporated and functioning for
a long time.
A. Where a Religious Order is incorporating an institution to which
it has committed substantial funds and resources, every effort should be
made to secure the ownership and control of such an institution by the
Religious Order. For the sake of clarity, let us assume the new institution
is a hospital. The following recommendations are made for achieving this
purpose:
1) The membership of the Hospital Corporation should be the same as the
Religious Corporation, i.e., Major Superior and Her Council.
2) The members of the Hospital Corporation should retain the right to
nominate and appoint the trustees or Board of Directors of the Hospital
Corporation.
3) To the extent that the Religious Order has committed funds to the Hos-
pital Corporation, to that extent the Religious Corporation should hold a
mortgage on the property, or a note secured by a deed of trust with the
hospital as collateral, or even just a note of record. The point is that the
ecclesiastical contribution should be preserved by some legal instrument
enforceable in law. To the extent that such instruments restrict the borrow-
ing capacity of the Hospital Corporation, to that extent the encumbrances
held by the Religious Order can be subordinated to other debt obligations.
These devices will make certain that the property rights of the Religious
Order, the patrimony of the Church, will be preserved.
4) All transactions between the Religious Order and the Hospital Corpora-
tion should be at arms length. Compensation paid to religious personnel
should be equivalent to comparable wages paid to lay personnel. Again, if the
financial burden to the Hospital becomes too acute, any payment back
should be evidenced by a note issued by the Hospital Corporation to the
Religious Corporation.
5) The charter of the Hospital Corporation should indicate its Catholic
sponsorship and its purpose should clearly indicate its Catholic orientation
and acceptance of Catholic teaching. As the Tilton College case tells us, such
a posture will not be fatal to participation in federal and most state aid
programs.
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6) A dissolution clause should provide that all the assets of the Hospital
Corporation be distributed to the Religious Corporation to be used for similar
charitable works of the Religious Congregation or to some other Religious
Congregation which carries on such charitable works.
Perhaps the best way to preserve the ownership and control of eccle-
siastical property is the creation of interrelationship of three corporations.
The Religious Corporation causes a hospital corporation to come into
being. The membership of both are the same-Major Superior and Her
Council. The sole purpose of the Hospital Corporation is to hold title to
the real estate and act as the lessor of these properties to a third corpora-
tion, a managing corporation. The terms of the lease can be written so as
to protect, by contract, the rights of Religious, e.g., no abortions, Catholic
philosophy, etc. The managing corporation could have greater flexibility
in the operation of the hospital, in determining the make-up of its Board
of Trustees etc., but ownership and control would be clear.
B. Where a Religious Corporation already exists, and where other
institutions have already been incorporated, the following recommenda-
tions are made:
1) To the extent possible, the charter and bylaws should be changed to
reflect the recommendations already made above.
2) To the extent possible, the debt obligations of the incorporated institu-
tion to the Religious Corporation should be made a matter of record and
proper legal instruments should be drawn to reflect this condition.
3) All future financial activity of the institution with the Religious Order
should reflect the arms-length transaction relationship spoken of above.
III
A very brief remark or two on diocesan corporations as such. In many
cases, it is inevitable and even desirable that various diocesan institutions
enjoy a separate incorporation. However, the non-profit character of such
corporations, not only subjects such institutions to the non-profit corpora-
tion law of the state, but also to the scrutiny and surveillance of the
attorney-general. Furthermore, the mood of federal taxing authorities
seems to indicate that, like private foundations, non-profit corporations
will soon be subject to careful examination by federal and state authorities.
On the other hand, the Diocese, as a canonical institution, as a Church,
will enjoy, for a while longer, immunity from such surveillance. Further-
more, the Diocese and its patrimony enjoys certain religious freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Therefore, to the extent that diocesan properties and institutions can be
held in the name of the Diocese as a canonical entity, they would seem to
enjoy the greatest freedom from governmental interference and also be
afforded the greatest protection under our Constitution.
If this presentation has seemed a bit sketchy, I apologize. However,
the issues are complex but very important. Billions of dollars are involved.
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As attorneys, we have the obligation of preserving this patrimony for the
Church. I hope I have cast a little light on this subject.
